



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-4,070/ISM-1(FOIA)

7 April 2003

Mr. John Young
Crptome.org
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

M. 6600114A
22, 115, 116, 118,
119, 120

Dear Mr. Young:

This responds to your request under the Freedom of Information Act dated 29 March 2001. Therein you requested records from the Army concerning Argentina Intelligence Services, ZF400004W. In processing your request, Army located 5 records within the purview of DIA and forwarded them to us on 4 October 2001 for review and direct response to you.

Upon review, it has been determined that some portions of three of the documents are not releasable. The portions withheld are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6), Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b)(1) applies to information properly classified under the criteria provided by Executive Order 12958. Subsection (b)(2) applies to information which pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of the agency. Subsection (b)(3) applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statute is 10 U.S.C. Section 424. Subsection (b)(6) applies to information which if released would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals. All reasonably segregable portions of the documents are attached hereto.

All substantive portions of the remaining two documents are not releasable. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), Freedom of Information Act. There are no reasonably segregable portions of this exempt material.

You are advised that a requester may appeal, within 60 days, an initial decision to withhold a record or part thereof. Should you wish to exercise this right, you may do so by referring to case #0069-02 and addressing your appeal to:

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: ISM-1(FOIA)
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Sincerely,


ROBERT P. RICHARDSON
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff

3 Enclosures a/s

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be crafted or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

2. SUBJECT: National Intelligence Center Legalized

9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 March 1973

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 9 March 1973

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

(b)(2) 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: 10 March 1973

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE [REDACTED]

14. APPROVING AUTH: [REDACTED]

(b)(2) 7. SOURCE: Press [REDACTED]

18. SUMMARY:

GOA law 20.194 was announced 9 March establishing a National Intelligence Center. The Intelligence Center will have elements from several collection agencies including those of SIDE, the Armed Forces and the Federal Police. Other sectors of government will participate as required in their areas of interest. The Center will be directed by a committee formed for the base organizations and will be presided over by a commander of Flag rank. The presiding officer will be titled Chief of National Intelligence and will be at Secretary level. The new chief will be named by the President based on the nomination by the Joint Commanders of the Armed Forces.

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1. FUNCTIONS: The National Intelligence Center will plan, orient, centralize and coordinate strategic intelligence production using assets of other intelligence services.
2. Induce and maintain a general appreciation for strategic Intelligence
3. Distribute strategic intelligence to the Executive, the National Security Council, the Military Committee, and the organs of planning and execution of National Security.
4. Formulate and maintain doctrine on national intelligence.

COMMENT: This law formalizes an already functioning ad hoc group and appears primarily an effort to put affairs in order before the change of government. This law replaces article 25 of GOA Law 16.970

15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

(b)(2) [REDACTED]

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

NONE

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

NONE

204-50
RECEIVED

16 MAR 5 1973

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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 50,
OPNAV FORM 5828 (Rev 10-61),
AF FORM 112, JUL 51, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 55.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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(Classification)
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COUNTRY ARGENTINA

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT 65-208 906 Argentine Army SIE and SSE (b)(2)

DATE OF REPORT 21 July 1960

NO. OF PAGES 3

013669

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO July 1960

PLACE & DATE ACQ
EVALUATION
SUMMARY

July 1960

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FROM
PREP
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(b)(3)

(b)(2) Report forwards information on structure and functions of SIE and SSE

with estimate of current capabilities. (SECRET)

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT
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EXCEPT: NO. BY AUTHORITY OF
21 July 1960.

(b)(3)

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(b)(2) Distribution by Originator:

1 Incl
Chart - SIE and SSE (b)(2) (NOFORN)

1. The Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) is divided into two groups, the Army Intelligence School and an organization of intelligence agents with field offices throughout the country. The overall intelligence effort of the Army's Servicio de Informaciones del Ejercito (SIE) is apparently confined to operations within the country of ARGENTINA. Exterior operations are the responsibility of Division II, Argentine Army General Staff through its control of the attache system, in coordination with the responsibility of Secretaria de Informaciones del Estado (SIE) which employs agents overseas in a manner similar to the United States CIA.

2. The director of the SIE, at present a colonel, base branch Cavalry, reports directly to the Secretary of Army. His school operates through a sub-director, at present rank of colonel, and produces officer and non-commissioned officer graduates for duty as intelligence officers at all levels within the Army including General Staff and, in addition, agent officers to serve in the Servicio de Seguridad del Ejercito, Security Service of the Army (SSE). The SSE is apparently an undercover organization similar to the secret service employed by Peron but operated under regulations which minimize its interior spying activity on units of the Army and maximizes its ability to keep check on subversive activities, be they in guise of peronism, communism, or an incipient "golpe" against the government.

3. SSE officers are not openly identified although they are probably known to the commanding generals of each major field command, division and army and to the commanding officers of the Military Regions. The SSE officers presumably have stations near all major Army field commands and, likewise, in the major urban areas.

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POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

(b)(2)

They maintain liaison with the unit intelligence officers at Army and divisional level. If required by any unit commander, they will place agents within the unit to counteract reported subversive activities.

4. It is presumed that Major David René CARRERA whose house was bombed recently in the suburb of Olivos, Buenos Aires, resulting in the death of a child, was an active SSE officer. It is even said that the force of the explosion in his home was increased by stores of explosives which he himself was keeping within his house. At any rate he is said to have led severe action in the past against various peronist labor organizations and for this he was marked for retaliation.

5. The SSE organization as well as the School of Information is centered and directed from an open office building in BUENOS AIRES. There is no attempt to conceal the identity of these two buildings. This is typical of the Naval Intelligence School or SIN as well as the SII. However the number of SSE agents is not known to [REDACTED]

It is estimated they are numerous.

(b)(1)

It is noted that this same request i.e. for high-level staff guidance against communism, has been received from General Staff officers. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

The most recent expression of interest from the General Staff has been as to the operation of the U. S. Army Psychological Warfare School.

6. There is apparently no central clearance system operated by the Argentine Army. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] expressed confidence that the Argentine Army did not need to use such a system for its officer corps because of the system of induction through the National Military Academy and the close relation which exists within a small officer corps. Neither were they concerned about the NCOs, although they admitted that occasionally they were required to place known communist sympathizers at unimportant posts. All NCOs are inducted through an Army Academy 4-year course.

7. The orientation of the Argentine Army intelligence effort is believed to be the result of the Army's pre-occupation with a threat of revolutionary warfare. Although five years have elapsed since the ouster of Perón, the Army believes that still exists within the country a peronist base within the laboring class which could be exploited either from within or without the country by the type of undisciplined leadership which emerged in CUBA. Communism is believed a threat inasmuch as it would exploit this peronist mass or control the leaders. The Argentine Army believes that communism will never penetrate the Argentine Army officer corps and will always be partially checked in public by the Catholic Church. The Army advocates a stern policy by the Federal Government both in eradicating communists from the key positions to which it is believed it is now infiltrated and in suppressing peronist revival. The Army believes that communism has already entered its second phase of activity in ARGENTINA, that is, that the government, the Police force and the schools have been infiltrated. It is a duty then of the SSE to report on this immediately within the country and it was probably based upon their reports that Secretary of Army LARCHER was so outspoken in his criticism of the government of CORDOBA several weeks prior to the implementation of the CONITES Plan. Likewise this plan and the subsequent federal intervention of the Province of CORDOBA was in large based on intelligence developed by the SSE. To date, however, there has been very little publicity about the activities of these agents and all public statements have been made by the line commander concerned. In the case of CORDOBA the Fourth Division Commander, General LANDA, obviously primed with information, spear-headed the Army's criticism of the Government of CORDOBA.

COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)


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REPORT NO. ID
PAGE NO. 1, Incl
FROM

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EXC



Commandant SIE - Colonel Mario Oscar CAMARGO

Commandant Intelligence School - Colonel Jorge M. SFI

Chief SSE - Colonel Rodríguez

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MESSAGE

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(b)(2) FROM:

TO: DA WASH DC

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(b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(2)

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[SSE - Army Security Service]

1. Argentine Army Servicio de Informaciones (SIE) does control type CIC organization from central intelligence school operated in Buenos Aires to include regional offices for SSE (Servicio de Seguridad Del Ejercito). SSE organization parallels army organization estimated to division level probably covering all important population centers. Note that SSE officer is not a member of local unit staff but functions directly under control of commandant for service of security who has office at information school in Buenos Aires. Note also SSE officers now prohibited use under cover agents within army units without knowledge commander. Other-wise mission of SSE similar to USCIC.

2. Estimate total number officers active within SSE under 30 based upon overall information school output of which SSE personnel constitute minority. Apparently SSE organization at one time included secret agents but these disbanded subsequent Peron. (b)(1) believes communist infiltration of Argentine Army officer and NCO rank non-existent. (To indicate control by SSE cited one recent 1957 case of an officer dismissed from army for liaison with notorious woman communist) based on system of selection of officers and length of training three years (b)(1) estimates SSE should constitute efficient corps but note that principal objective is detection sources revolutionary warfare outside of army. Reliance upon national military academy and NCO schools plus general knowledge of individual reputation prevalent through small professional and NCO officer corps is considered substitute system of security check and control file on officers of NCOs.

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